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Abstract  Automated assembly and Workpiece Inspection 
Systems (AAWIS) must fulfill ever higher requirements. At 
the same time, the high expenditures have to be 
compensated by high availability as well as high quality and 
quantity performance. In addition to these requirements, 
recently a new quality characteristic has been gaining 
importance, namely the fail-safety of AAWIS. While the 
manual calibration of inspection processes is state of the art, 
for automated processes the question arises: Who monitors 
the inspection devices? The difference between automated 
production measurement and laboratory measurement lies in 
monitorability. In laboratory measurement, the operator can 
check the measured values for plausibility and carries out an 
evaluation afterwards, whereas automatic production is not 
capable of this “common sense” process. These influences 
cause the measurement uncertainty of AAWIS to show 
larger variations. Nowadays, we face these challenges by 
using robust measurement systems with systematic and 
periodic manual monitoring and calibration. However, this 
method brings about a conflict between quality performance 
and availability of an AAWIS. One possible solution for this 
conflict is the use of fail-safe Automated Workpiece 
Inspection Systems. These systems are characterized by 
automatic monitoring of their operability, which reduces the 
frequency of manual monitoring. This helps to meet the 
growing quality requirements and the tightened liability 
regulations. 
 
Keywords Measurement in production, diagnostic, error 
detection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In order to implement the successful combination 
of highly automated systems with highly qualified 
staff in Germany as economically as possible, 
Automated Assembly and Workpiece Inspection 
Systems (AAWIS) must fulfill ever higher 
requirements. For instance, the product (assembly) 
differentiation requires a high flexibility of AAWIS 
[1]. At the same time, the high expenditures have to be 
compensated by high availability as well as high 
quality and quantity performance (high quality, 
efficiency) with low service efforts (maintenance 
properties) as quickly as possible (short amortization 
period). 
 In addition to these requirements, recently a new 
quality characteristic has been gaining importance, 
namely the fail-safety of AAWIS. While the manual 
monitoring of automatic processes is state of the art 
[2], for automated processes the question arises: Who 
monitors the inspection devices? To meet these new 
requirements, additional diagnostic concepts are 
necessary. The systematic structuring, planning and 
implementation of these diagnostic concepts 
contributes significantly to the increase in quality 
performance and availability of AAWIS. Fig. 1 shows 
an example of AAWIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1: Automated Assembly and Workpiece Inspection System (AAWIS) 
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 The difference between automated production 
measurement technology (PMT) and laboratory 
measurement technology (LMT) lies in monitorability. 
In laboratory measurement, the operator can check the 
measured values for plausibility and carries out an 
evaluation afterwards, whereas automatic systems are  
not capable of this “common sense“ process. In LMT, 
the operator and the measurement strategy dominate 
the measurement [3], whereas these factors play a less 
important role for PMT. In PMT, the measurement 
result is influenced by the uncertainties of the work- 
piece, the reliability of the measurement system and 
the ambient conditions [4]. In automated inspection 
processes, workpiece hygiene (e.g. cleanliness) can 
vary from measurement to measurement. In addition, 
the ambient conditions are normally far less stable 
than in the measurement laboratory. 
 
2. DIAGONSTIC CONCEPTS FOR  FAIL-SAFE 
AAWIS 
 
 This paper is about the planning and implementa-
tion of diagnostic concepts to create fail-safe AAWIS 
by using automated methods of error detection .  
Error detection – definition: 
Analyzing an AAWIS with automatic methods to 
find out deviations between actual state and desired 
state. 
 
 The aim is to improve quality performance and 
availability of these systems. Fail-safety means the 
ability of AAWIS to detect errors immediately or 
shortly after their appearance.  
Fail-safety – definition: 
The ability of an AAWIS to detect errors imme-
diately after their occurrence. 
 
 While manual methods of error detection (e.g. 
calibration, counter measures with reference parts) 
bring about a delay between the occurrence of an error 
and its detection, which leads to a larger number of 
Not-OK Parts due to the error, diagnostic concepts are 
automatic methods that are characterized by the fact 
that the occurrence of an error is detected either im-
mediately or after a short period of time. Systems with 
integrated diagnostic concepts are called “fail-safe”.  
 Using diagnostic concepts in AAWIS reduces the 
number of Not-OK Parts. Errors are detected at an 
early point in time and can be eliminated. The share of 
scrap and rework parts during assembly is minimized 
and that of the good parts is maximized. This increas-
es the quality performance of production metrology.  
 The methods of error detection  are divided into 
the following groups: Redundancy concepts, self-tests 
and plausibility criteria (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Redundancy concepts 
 Redundant systems are used in many industrial 
sectors. They help to increase the output quantity, to 
create a system that is safe in the event of a failure, 
and to increase availability and fail-safety. For fault-
prone or unsafe inspection components, several in-
spection systems (normally two)2 are provided [5]. 
 
Redundancy – definition  
“The presence of more functional means in a unit 
than would be necessary to fulfill the function re-
quirements” [6] 
 
 Redundancy can be divided into hardware redun-
dancy and analytic redundancy Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1. Hardware redundancy 
 Hardware redundancy can be divided into 
homogeneous redundancy, “…where all means are of 
the same type…”, and diverse redundancy, “…where 
the means are of different types…”.[6] This means 
that homogeneous redundancy has the same functions 
and the same active principles, and that diverse 
redundancy has the same functions but different active 
principles. Homogeneous redundancy holds the risk 
that, due to the homogeneous structures and the 
homogeneous active principles, certain influences 
equally affect all redundant systems. This kind of 
error is called “common-mode error”. When diverse 
redundant systems are used, it is important that the 
measuring results of the systems can be compared due 
to the different active principles.  
   
2 Unlike safety-relevant systems, e.g. in aircraft construction 
or in nuclear power engineering, where triple redundan-
cy is standard, production metrology needs to be 
guarded by one additional system only. 
Redundancy concepts
Hardware redundancy Analytic redundancy
 
Fig. 3: Redundancy concepts 
 
Fig. 2: Methods of error detection 
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 While in safety technology, diverse redundancy is 
the best choice to detect common-mode errors, it is 
less desirable in measurement technology. A main 
reason for this is that the different measuring and 
active principles lead to different measurement 
uncertainties. Consequently, the permissible 
maximum difference increases, which leads to an 
avoidable deterioration of error detection.  
 Fig. 4 shows a measuring station as an example of 
homogeneous hardware redundancy. The application 
is based on the calculation and evaluation of the 
difference between the measurement results. The 
permissible maximum difference is the basis for 
setting tolerance limits for the difference control chart; 
it depends from the (measurement) uncertainty of the 
measuring systems.  
As mentioned above, one disadvantage is that 
common-mode errors (e.g. wrong reference part used 
for both stations) are not detected. This is the reason 
why additional methods (e.g. calibration control chart) 
should be employed for detecting common-mode 
errors. This could be a subject for further research and 
will not be discussed in detail here.  
 Structure and princi ple of the example shown in 
Fig. 4: The characteristic is measured in the first 
measuring station and then in the second. The active 
principle is the same in both measuring stations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Example for homogeneous redundancy in  
measuring stations 
 Ev aluation: Calculation of the two measurement 
results (e.g. 1-2) and evaluation of the difference as a 
scale for the stability of the measurement value. The 
difference must lie within a set tolerance. For evaluat-
ing the characteristic, the measurement result of the 
measuring station with the lower measurement uncer-
tainty can be used. If the uncertainties are the same, 
which is probable in this structure, an average value 
from the two results should be created. This can addi-
tionally reduce the measurement uncertainty (root  
n – law [7]). 
 Advanta ges:  
- Highly reliable measurement result,  
- Errors are detected immediately,  
- Optimization of calibrating cycles is possible and  
- Condition based maintenance of the AAWIS. 
  Disadvantages: 
- Additional measuring station, 
- Additional meas. value input in meas. computer and  
- Additional space necessary in assembly unit.  
 Additional requirements: This structure is very 
sensitive to disturbance variables (e.g. dirt). Therefore, 
the process must be additionally guarded. The number 
of subsequent Not-OK evaluations should be 
monitored. Permitting no more than three subsequent 
violations of the control limits in the difference 
control chart has proven to be a good method.  
 The permissible difference between station 1 and 
station 2 depends on the measuring uncertainty. Fig. 5 
shows the approach to calculation of the permissible 
maximum difference between station 1 and station 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The difference comprises the random and the non-
correctable systematic portion of the measurement 
uncertainty (Fig. 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Difference between both measurements 
Random portion Non-correctable systematic portion 
Constant component Variable component
Evaluation of the 
calibration deviations 
Determination of 
linearity deviationsStatistical tests
Fig. 6: Influences and their determination on the  
difference between the two measurements 
Permissible maximum difference 
Distribution 
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Non-correctable 
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Fig. 5: Difference between the two measuring stations 
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 The portions are defined as non-correctable sys-
tematic deviations and are therefore linear added (1) to 
create the permissible maximum difference between 
the two measurement results [8]. When applying the 
model in day to day practice it is helpful to have an 
additional portion that represents deviations, which 
are not determined by the performed uncertainty stu-
dies. This portion is determined by the user depending 
on measurement needs. 
 
ΔMax. = Random + Calibration + Linearity + Practice (1) 
Max.  : Permissible maximum difference 
    between the measuring results 
Random  : Random portion of the difference 
Calibration : Portion from calibration deviation  
    between the measuring stations 
Linearity : Portion of the linearity deviation 
Practice  : Practice deviation 
 
 Fig. 7 shows an example of the difference between 
two measuring stations with identical construction 
(homogeneous hardware redundancy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Example for the difference calculated as 
station 1 minus station 2 
 
2.1.2 Analytic Redundancy 
 Methods for error detection that are based on 
analytic redundancy make use of information that is 
already available in the process. In this method, data 
that was originally generated for other purposes is 
logically combined, which makes it possible to deduce 
monitoring information from it. 
 
Definition: Analytic redundancy gains the redundant 
information from knowledge that is already available  
in the process observed. 
 
 An example for analytic redundancy are parallel 
measuring stations in AAWIS. Parallel measuring 
stations with identical construction are used in AA-
WIS for quantity performance reasons. The redundan-
cy created in this way can be used for cross-
monitoring the measuring stations. Errors, such as an 
offset due to faulty calibration or influences on the 
measuring device during production, can thus be de-
tected. The fail-safety is based on the comparison of 
the two measuring stations’ measurement results by 
way of calculating the difference. Fig. 8 shows a 
schematic illustration of parallel measuring stations 
with identical construction. The parts are produced in 
an assembly station and distributed to the two measur-
ing stations in random sequence. 
Meas.
PC 1
Transport
Workpiece
Measuring
station 1
Assembly
station
Creating the sliding average values
 and         out of n measures
using the hypothesis t-test
xg1 xg2
Calculating the  warning and control limits for the difference
between        -         using the error band
 Quality control chart for          -
Measuring
station 2
Meas.
PC 2
UCL
QC chart x2
LCL
UCL
QC chart x1
LCL
xg1 xg2
UWL
LWL
UCL
LCL
xg1 xg2
UCL Upper Control Limit
LCL Lower Control Limit
UWL Upper Warning Limit
LWL Lower Warning Limit
Fig. 8: Assembly station and parallel measuring stations 
with identical construction 
 
 At first, the measurement results are monitored 
with an original value control chart (QC chart) as 
usual. In addition, sliding average values are created 
from original n-values. Based on a test run, a hypothe-
sis test (t-test) is carried out to evaluate the appropriate 
number n for creating a sliding average value [9].  
 This is an iterative process that is continued by a 
computer program until a number n has been found 
that constitutes a representative volume of random 
tests for the course of the process. The optimization 
aim is to smooth the test statistic tPrüf  with a preferably 
large n, and at the same time a preferably short delay 
in the response behavior with a preferably small n. 
Fig. 9 shows a test run with a measurement deviation 
from original value 51. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Der im Folgende angewandte Hypothese-Test ist ein 
Mittelwertvergleich mit einer t-verteilten Prüfgröße 
(tPrüf) und wird deshalb auch t-Test genannt.  
 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91
Value No.
M
ea
su
re
d 
va
lu
e Original value 51
Original value 55 Station 1Station 2
Fig. 9: Test run with easuring deviation due to an error 
starting with original value no. 51 
No. 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 m
m
 
UCL
LCL
 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko-012:1 Joint International IMEKO TC1+ TC7+ TC13 Symposium 
August 31st September 2nd, 2011, Jena, Germany 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko:2 
 
 The hypothesis test shown in table 1 is an original 
value comparison with a t-distributed test statistic 
(tPrüf) and is therefore also called t-test. 
 
Table 1: Mathematic bases of the t-test [10] 
Zero hypothesis Alternative hypothesis 
21    21    
with the test statistic                 
d
üf s
xx
t 21Pr
   
The null hypothesis is abandoned when: 
21;Pr  füf tt  
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n
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n
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)1(
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2
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1
1
2
1
n
s
n
s
n
s
c

  
     …sliding averages of station 1 and 2 
n1, n2…number of values to calculate the sliding averages  
s1, s2…standard deviation of the values used to calculate the 
sliding averages; sd, f, c …parameters for calculation 
 
 The test is among the “…robust statistical 
methods…”, in which “…the test result is only 
slightly affected by a deviation of the probability 
distribution from the normal distribution”.[11] 
Therefore, a test on normal distribution is dispensable. 
The t-test is carried out with a level of significance of 
99.9% ( =0,1%) and 99.0% ( =1%).  
 Fig. 10 shows the t-test with n=6. The level of 
significance of 99.9% is exceeded at data point 50. 
This equals original value 55 in Fig. 9. This defines 
the response behavior with 5 production parts after the 
occurrence of the significant measurement deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After further knowledge about the behavior of the 
assembly and measuring process has been collected, 
the selected n is checked iteratively until a stable 
monitoring process has been defined. 
 The warning and control limits for the quality 
control chart are determined with the error band on 
different levels of significance. Experts recommend a 
error band of 99% for the control limits and a error 
band  of 95% for the warning limits [12]. The calcula-
tion (2) is carried  out according to [10]: 
 
dfdf stxxstxx   21;212121;21   (2) 
 If the error band is left, it can be assumed with a 
certainty of P = 1 -   that the measurement 
uncertainty of one of the two measuring processes has 
increased significantly.  
 Since sliding average values are used for 
calculating the limits, the warning and control limits 
are also “sliding”. Therefore, the user must set an 
“average” limit. Fig. 11 shows the average warning 
and control limits based on the stable part of the test 
run (Fig. 9 up to original value 50). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In assembly technology, outliers can frequently 
occur. These would affect the variation of the sliding 
average value such that it would not deliver a repre-
sentative picture of the overall variation. Therefore, 
outliers should not be used for creating the sliding 
average value. In automated monitoring, this can be 
effected with the definition of threshold limits. Meas-
ured values that violate these threshold limits are not 
used for the calculation. Control limits, tolerance 
limits or additionally defined limits can be used as 
threshold limits. 
 
2.2 Self-tests for error detection 
 
 Definition: 
With self-tests, individual components of AAWIS 
test their functionality on their own. This can be 
effected with software, e.g. with cyclic tests, or 
with hardware, with mechanical or electric compo-
nents. 
 
 Self-tests can be activated in defined periodical 
intervals, after manual interferences (e.g. maintenance, 
repair) or during each restart of the system.  
 An example of self-tests is given for measuring 
chains (transducer, cable and evaluating unit) with 
strain gage measuring bridge (Wheatstone bridge 
circuit). These measuring chains can be tested by 
monitoring the zero-point and calibration value (Fig. 
12). Both tests are operated under idling (no load) 
condition.  
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Zero-point test: With the zero-point test, the correct 
balance of the measuring bridge under no load is 
checked. It can vary for example due to changes of the 
strain gage adhesion point and damage to the strain 
gages due to over load. In the zero-point test, a 
defined direct current supply voltage (VS) is applied 
(e.g. 5V). The calibration resistance R5 is disabled. 
The result from current flow and internal resistance of 
the measuring bridge is a (response) measuring signal 
of VM = 0V, but only if the measuring bridge is 
balanced. If the measuring bridge is detuned, the 
measuring signal deviates from a permissible 
tolerance, in this case e.g. 0V +/- 20mV (Fig. 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Calibration value test:  In the calibration value 
test, the measuring bridge is selectively detuned via 
the calibration resistance R5 by closing a switch (Fig. 
13). Supply voltage VS is applied like in measuring 
mode (e.g. 5V). The system is under no load in idling 
condition. The result of the detuning can be measured 
as the signal VM.. If the measuring bridge has a defect, 
the measuring signal deviates from a permissible 
tolerance.  
The advantage of the calibration value test is that the 
measuring chain can be additionally checked by 
monitoring a characteristic (response) signal of 
functional strain gage measuring system. Critical 
errors that affect the measurement, e.g. a change in the 
adhesion point of the strain gage measurement strips, 
can thus be detected more reliably.  
 In each application, the response signal and its 
expected variation must be defined depending on the t 
ransducer and the supply voltages applied.  
 
 In both tests described, the entire measuring chain, 
e.g. transducer, cable, measurement amplifier and 
evaluating unit, can be tested. Differences occur only 
when different voltages are applied.  
 Its applicability depends on the technical design of 
the transducer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Plausibilty criteria 
 
Plausibility criteria are methods of failure detec-
tion, which enable to evaluate the right dimension of 
an assembly or measurement result. 
 
Definition: Methods for the evaluation of the regu-
larity and coherence of incidents in AAWIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-test  
Zero-point test Calibration value test
 
Fig. 12: Example for self-tests in a measuring chain with 
strain gages in a Wheatstone bridge circuit 
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R1 – R4 ... Strain gages; R5...calibration resistance 
Vss... Stabilized supply voltage in V 
VM...Measuring signal in mV  
VO...Amplified measuring signal in V 
S1...Switch to activate the calibration value test 
 
Fig. 13: Wheatstone bridge circuit with calibration  
resistance for detuning [4]
 
Fig. 14: Zero-point test at a torque sensor with Wheat-
stone bridge circuit. 
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Fig. 15: Calibration value test at a torque sensor with 
Wheatstone bridge circuit. 
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Fig. 16: Examples for Plausibility criteria [4]  
 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko-012:1 Joint International IMEKO TC1+ TC7+ TC13 Symposium 
August 31st September 2nd, 2011, Jena, Germany 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko:2 
 
2.3.1 Calibration value control chart 
 
The calibration value control chart will be used for 
checking if the calibration of a measurement system 
lies in the range of the expected calibration result.  
For that purpose, a calibration standard with a known 
and to international standards traceable actual value 
will be measured by the measurement system. The 
displayed value will be registered in a quality control 
chart and compared with the control limits, which 
were defined before. The control limits represent the 
extended measurement uncertainty (+/- U) [4]. 
 
2.3.2 Rest position monitoring 
The rest position monitoring in the measuring 
chain will be realized by the definition of a rest 
position range and a measuring position outside this 
range. After the start of the measuring procedure, the 
measurement signal (point 1) must leave the rest 
position window and return to it after completion 
(point 2 in figure 17). Damages in the measuring 
chain, as e.g. defect measuring sensor, cable breakage 
or a faulty adjustment of the sensor can be detected by 
using this plausibility criterion. 
 
2.3.3 Calibration window monitoring 
 
For this plausibility criterion, the calibration must 
be executed in a calibration area which was defined 
before. This should be in the middle of the measuring 
range. The guidance value for the width of the 
calibration window is twenty percent of the measuring 
range. The monitoring of the measuring range has two 
functions. Firstly, linearity faults will be minimized. 
Secondly, adjustment faults, damages at the measuring 
chain and measuring station as well as excessive wear 
will be detected. 
3. CREATING DIAGNOSTIC CONCEPTS BY 
INTELLIGENT COMBINATION OF 
METHODS 
 
As innovation at the planning of AAWIS, the 
methods of the failure detection will be combined to 
diagnostic concepts, so that they improve in their 
whole the quality performance and availability of 
AAWIS. It will be distinguished between a standard 
safety package (SSP) and additional diagnostic 
methods [4]. 
 
3.1 Standard safety package (SSP) 
 
The SSP should be applied in all AAWIS. All 
failure detection methods which are necessary as a 
prerequisite for an acceptable quality performance of 
an AAWIS are combined in this standard (Tab. 1). 
 
M
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g 
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n 
Rest position monitoring 
(monitoring of idling position of the sensor)  
Calibration window monitoring  
 
Multi-position calibration at measurement systems, 
whose linearity behavior must be defined in the 
measuring range (e.g., pneumatic measurement 
systems). 
Automatic calibration interval 
 
St
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n 
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l Check availability of workpiece 
 
Position and location monitoring of workpieces 
 
Monitoring of start and end position of movements 
 
Pr
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s  
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Mandatory parts evaluation “unknown“, till all 
assembly and inspection procedures are positively 
finished. 
Ban with permit 
Good track is blocked in the setup and automatic 
operation 
Bad part acknowledgment 
 
Stop after several subsequent (normally three times) 
bad part evaluations 
Change of the (normal) basic conditions (e.g., foul-
ing) must lead to a bad part evaluation 
Bad part classification; for each bad part feature an 
own storage space.  
Exception: reasonable combination of features 
M
an
ua
l i
nt
er
ve
nt
io
n 
Idle cycling after manual intervention. Discharge 
remaining quantity of the machine 
Clear sorting at emergency stop or stop at idling 
position and at restart (e.g. after disturbances) 
Colored marking of reference parts 
 
Non-manipulable bad part containers and transport 
belts 
Reference parts (e.g., calibration and plausibility 
parts) will be discharged automatically 
Table 1: Standard safety package [4] 
 
 
Fig. 17: Rest position monitoring [4] 
Fig. 18: Calibration window monitoring [4] 
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3.2 Additional safety package (ESP) 
 
The ESP includes all methods of failure detection, 
which do not belong to the standard. Whereas the SSP 
consists of standardized failure detection methods, the 
ESP however can be planned variably. Depending on 
the failure possibilities which will be planned for the 
AAWIS, the planning team will work out a demand-
oriented combination of the methods. 
For that purpose a planning tool has been created, 
which will be used by the planning team for the evalu-
ation of final faults through the standard safeguarding 
algorithm and for the execution of a risk analysis with 
a risk priority number (RPN). 
The detection probability (E) is one measure for the 
failure detection of a method. One measure for the 
significance of the final failure are the incidence and 
the weight. The incidence, weight and detection as 
well as the estimated costs for the failure detection 
methods were defined by a team of experts (fig 19).  
The costs arise per type, this means per execution. 
The costs for the reference normal (working normal) 
for example arise normally per characteristic which 
has to be measured, the costs for the automatic pro-
gram change however arise only one-time at type 
change. The indication of the cost height is a non-
binding estimate and must be adjusted to the respec-
tive branch (e.g., automotive supply industry). 
 
4. SUMMARY 
 
 The commonly know tool FMEA is used to 
combine methods of error detection to intelligent 
diagnostic concepts to guarantee fail safe AAWIS.  
Fail-safety of AAWIS is the ability to detect errors 
immediately or shortly after their appearance. This is 
the precondition for minimizing manual preventive 
maintenance in the form of inspection and calibration 
without risking a reduction of an AAWIS’ quality 
performance. This helps to meet the growing quality 
requirements and the tightened liability regulations. 
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Fig. 19: Combination of methods of error detection by using a FMEA to create diagnostic concepts 
